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A new scheme of Quantum Key Distribution is proposed using three entangled particles in a GHZ
state. Alice holds a 3-particle source and sends two particles to Bob, keeping one with herself. Bob
uses one particle to generate a secure key, and the other to generate a master-key. This scheme
should prove to be harder to break in non-ideal situations as compared to the standard protocols
BB84 and Eckert. The scheme uses the concept of Quantum Disentanglement Eraser. Extension to
multi-partite scheme has also been investigated.
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Crypting messages for secret communication is a very
old problem. The so-called Vernam Cipher [1] or one-
time pad, is a method which is believed to be the most
secure, with the caveat that it is based on a shared key
which can only be used once. This led to people explor-
ing the possibility of remotely sharing a new secret key in
a secure way. Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows
two parties, conventionally called Alice and Bob, to gen-
erate a common string of secret bits, the secret key, in
the presence of an eavesdropper, usually called Eve [2].
The key so generated, may be used for crypting messages
using Vernam Cipher. The pioneering protocol for QKD
was given by Bennet and Brassard in 1984, in a confer-
ence in Bangalore [3]. Later another equivalent proto-
col was given by Eckert utilizing properties of entangled
states [4]. In principle, QKD is hundred percent secure,
the proof being provided by the laws of quantum me-
chanics [5]. However, real-life implementations of QKD
have various issues which make them deviate from the
assumptions in idealized models. By exploiting security
loopholes in practical realizations, notably imperfections
in the detectors, various attacks have been successfully
demonstrated against commercial QKD systems [6, 7].
Here we introduce a new QKD method using three en-
tangled particles. This method introduces an additional
element in the standard key distribution protocols, to
make it harder to break in non-ideal situations.
I. BB84 AND ECKERT PROTOCOLS
The basic quantum key distribution protocol of BB84
[3] or Eckert [4] is as follows.
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1. An entangled spin-1/2 particle source produces a
sequence of particles pairs, in a singlet state, one
going to Alice, and one to Bob.
2. Bob measures the incoming particles’ spin states
by randomly choosing a measurement of either the
x-component of the spin or the z-component, with
equal probability.
3. Bob publicly tells Alice which bases he used for each
particle he received (but, of course not the result
of his measurement).
4. Alice publicly tells Bob which bases she used to
measure her particles.
5. Alice and Bob keep only the data from those mea-
surements for which their bases are the same, dis-
carding all the rest.
6. This data is interpreted as a binary sequence ac-
cording to the coding scheme |+〉x = 1, |−〉x = 0,
|+〉z = 1, |−〉z = 0 for Alice, and |+〉x = 0, |−〉x =
1, |+〉z = 0, |−〉z = 1 for Bob.
7. Alice announces the results of a small subset of her
measurements. Bob checks if he has identical re-
sults. Any discrepency here indicates a possible
evesdropping attempt.
8. If there is no discrepancy, the rest of the binary
sequence is treated as the new key, and is identical
for both Alice and Bob.
If the entangled-particle source is held by Alice, and
only one particle travels to Bob and the other remains
with Alice, the protocol is essentially BB84. She could
replace it by a source producing single particles, each of
which she measures before forwarding it to Bob. The
consequences will be identical to those described above.
2II. THREE PARTICLE ENTANGLEMENT
Let us consider the following 3-particle entangled state,
known as the GHZ state [8]
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉1| ↑〉2| ↑〉3 + | ↓〉1| ↓〉2| ↓〉3), (1)
where the states | ↑〉i, | ↓〉i are eigenstates of the operator
σiz . and, let us also consider the following transforma-
tion in basis,
| ↑〉i = 1√
2
(|+〉i + |−〉i), | ↓〉i = 1√
2
(|+〉i − |−〉i) (2)
for i=1,2 and 3. If we just look at the subspaces of par-
ticles 1 and 2, their state is not a pure entangled state,
but a mixed state, as can be seen by writing the den-
sity matrix for (1) and tracing over the states | ↑〉3, | ↓〉3.
Here, the results of measurement of σ1z and σ2z will be
correlated, but results of measurements of σ1x and σ2x
will not be correlated.
Writing the states of particle 3 in terms of the eigen-
states of σ3x, (1) can be written as
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(| ↑〉1| ↑〉2 + | ↓〉1| ↓〉2)|+〉3
+
1
2
(| ↑〉1| ↑〉2 − | ↓〉1| ↓〉2) |−〉3. (3)
As we have not changed the state, measurements on par-
ticle 1 and 2 will not show any quantum correlations.
However, if one also makes a measurement of σ3x, and
picks out only those results of measurement of particle 1
and 2, for which particle 3 yields |+〉3, particle 1 and 2
will show quantum correlation. Particles 1 and 2, which
appeared to be disentangled in state (1), are now entan-
gled. One can say that a measurement of σ3x has erased
the disentaglement between particle 1 and 2. Correlat-
ing the measurements of particles 1 and 2 with |−〉3 will
also lead to an entanglement of 1 and 2, but of a slightly
different form. This concept of quantum disentanglement
eraser was introduced by Garisto and Hardy [9].
As one can see, measurement of particle 3, in a par-
ticular basis, has the potential to control the nature of
entanglement of particles 1 and 2. We use this feature to
construct a new 3-particle protocol for QKD. The GHZ
state has been used before to construct QKD protocol for
sharing a secure key between three parties [10]. However,
we are only interested in two-party key-sharing.
III. MASTER-KEY SECURED QKD
(MKS-QKD)
In the following we propose a key distribution scheme
where Alice holds a 3-particle source which generates a
sequence of particle trios in a GHZ state given by (1). She
sends particle 2 and 3 to Bob and keeps particle 1 with
herself. Bob calls (say) particle 3 as master channel and
the particle 2 as secure channel. He measures σ3x on the
master channel so that he gets either |+〉3 or |−〉3. One
can see from (3) that if Alice and Bob measure σ1z and
σ2z respectively, their results will always be correlated.
For example, if Alice gets | ↓〉1 Bob will necessarily get
| ↓〉2, and if Alice gets | ↑〉1 Bob will necessarily get | ↑〉2,
irrespective of the results of the master channel.
Now if Alice and Bob (on particle 2) measure σix, writ-
ing (1) in terms of the eigenstates of σix will make it
easier to see what will happen.
|ψ〉 = 1
2
(|+〉1|+〉2 + |−〉1|−〉2) |+〉3
+
1
2
(|+〉1|−〉2 + |−〉1|+〉2) |−〉3. (4)
It is clear from the above that if the master channel mea-
surement gives |+〉3 the measurement results of Alice and
Bob (on particle 2) on σix will be identical. On the other
hand, if the master channel measurement gives |−〉3 the
measurement results of Alice and Bob (on particle 2) on
σix will be inverted with respect to each other.
On receiving the two particles through two different
channels, Bob randomly decides to use one channel to
generate his secure key, and the other to generate a
master-key. The details of the protocol are as follows.
1. A 3-particle source is held by Alice which generates
a sequence of 3 entangled particles. Particle 1 re-
mains with Alice, while particles 2 and 3 go to Bob
through two different channels.
2. Bob randomly chooses one channel to generate his
secure key and the other to generate the master-
key. Bob randomly chooses a different channel for
his master-key, for each pair that comes to him.
3. Alice measures the incoming particles’ spin states
by randomly choosing a measurement of either the
x-component of the spin or the z-component, with
equal probability. Bob does the same for his secure
channel.
4. Bob measures the x-component of the spin of par-
ticles from his master channel.
5. Alice and Bob publicly declare which bases they
used for the secure channel, for each particle they
received.
6. Alice and Bob keep only the data from those mea-
surements for which their secure channel bases are
the same, discarding all the rest.
7. This data is interpreted as a binary sequence ac-
cording to the coding scheme | ↑〉 → 1, | ↓〉 → 0,
|+〉 → 1, |−〉 → 0 by Alice and Bob.
Bob interprets the data of the master channel as
follows: |+〉 → 0, |−〉 → 1, if he measured x-
component in the secure channel; |+〉 → 0, |−〉 → 0,
3if he measured z-component in the secure channel.
Alice and Bob’s key doesn’t match at this stage.
8. Bob now adds the master-key to his key bit by bit,
modulo 2.
9. At this stage, the keys generated by Alice and Bob
are identical.
10. In order to check for any evesdropping attempt, Al-
ice announces the results of a small subset of her
measurements. Bob checks if he has identical re-
sults. Any discrepency here indicates a possible
evesdropping attempt. The rest of the sequence
now forms the usable key.
In the nearly impossible scenario if an evesdropper cor-
rectly guesses which is the master channel for each pair
of particles that travels to Bob, he can perform measure-
ment of σmx, where m is the particle number which is
considered to be the master channel, and can know in
advance Bob’s master-key. The security of this key dis-
tribution scheme then reduces to that of the Eckert or
BB84 protocol. However, there is no way an evesdrop-
per can correctly guess which one is the master channel
for every single pair. Evesdropper measuring σx on the
wrong channel will lead to his attempt being detected.
This feature introduces an additional complexity in the
secure key distribution, and consequently makes the key
sharing more robust against attacks.
IV. MASTER-KEY CONTROLLED QKD
(MKC-QKD)
We now use the concept of disentanglement eraser
to construct another kind of key distribution scheme in
which there is a Master who wishes to control the key
distribution between Alice and Bob. In this scheme, the
key held by the Master has a special position that with-
out using it Alice and Bob cannot share a secure key
eventhough they used the Eckert protocol. This is much
like a system in some bank lockers where the bank holds
a master-key without using which the key of an individ-
ual client doesn’t work. The protocol for the Master-key
controlled quantum key distribution works as follows.
1. An 3-particle source is held by the Master which
generates a sequence of 3 entangled particles. Par-
ticle 1 goes to Alice, particle 2 to Bob and particle
3 remains with the Master.
2. Alice and Bob measure the incoming particles’
spin states by randomly choosing a measurement
of either the x-component of the spin or the z-
component, with equal probability.
3. The Master measures the x-component of the spin
of his particle.
4. Bob and publicly declare which bases they used for
each particle they received (but, of course not the
result of the measurement).
5. Alice and Bob keep only the data from those mea-
surements for which their bases are the same, dis-
carding all the rest. The Master also discards the
data for particles for which Alice and Bob’s bases
do not match.
6. This data is interpreted as a binary sequence ac-
cording to the coding scheme | ↑〉 → 1, | ↓〉 → 0,
|+〉 → 1, |−〉 → 0 by Alice and Bob. The Master
interprets his data as follows: |+〉 → 0, |−〉 → 1,
if Alice and Bob measured x-component; |+〉 → 0,
|−〉 → 0, if Alice and Bob measured z-component.
All three now have a key, but Alice and Bob’s key
doesn’t match.
7. The Master announces his key publicly which Bob
adds to his key bit by bit, modulo 2.
8. At this stage, the keys generated by Alice and Bob
are identical.
9. In order to check for any evesdropping attempt, Al-
ice announces the results of a small subset of her
measurements. Bob checks if he has identical re-
sults. Any discrepency here indicates a possible
evesdropping attempt. The rest of the sequence
now forms the usable key.
Using this scheme the Master can effectively delay the
sharing of the key by any length of time. Another pos-
sible use of MKC-QKD is that if the entangled particles
are to be provided by a third party, this method provides
a way of authenticating the particle source. Without the
publicly sent master-key, the keys of Alice and Bob will
not match. Although this scheme provides a mechanism
which makes the involement of the Master necessary, it
may not provide any additional security over the BB84
and Eckert protocols.
V. MULTI-PARTICLE GHZ STATE
One might wonder if the n-particle GHZ state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[| ↑〉1| ↑〉2| ↑〉3 . . . | ↑〉n + | ↓〉1| ↓〉2| ↓〉3 . . . | ↓〉n],
(5)
posesses similar properties. In this state too, any two
particles are not entangled, as the two-particle reduced
density matrix, after tracing over rest of the n-2 particles,
is a mixed state density matrix. However, one can show
that if one measures the n-2 particles in an appropriate
basis, the entanglement between the two particles can
be brought back by correlating with the measurement
results of n-2 particles. This indicates that a QKD pro-
tocol is possible by using a n-particle GHZ state. Since a
n-particle entangled state has little practical use, we will
not go into the details of describing the QKD protocol.
4VI. CONCLUSION
The quantum disentanglement eraser idea for 3-
particle GHZ state has been used here to construct two
QKD protocols. The first one, where Alice holds the
3-particle source, provides an additional level of security
over the BB84 or Eckert protocols. In ideal circumstances
BB84 and Eckert methods provide unbreakable key shar-
ing, but in non-ideal cases several kinds of attacks can
be constructed. In such situations, our Master-Key Se-
cured QKD protocol will provide key-sharing which will
be harder to break. We have also provided a variant
which we call Master-Key Controlled QKD where three
parties are involved. MKC-QKD allows the possibility
for a third person, called Master, to control the key shar-
ing between Alice and Bob. Without the master-key pro-
vided publicly by the Master at a later stage, Alice and
Bob will be unable to share a secure key. Various practi-
cal uses of this method can be explored. For example, if
the source of particles is to be provided by a third party,
this method can be used to establish the authenticity of
the source. This variant, however, is not expected to
provide and additional security over the BB84 or Eckert
protocols.
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